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Deconstructing unlawful act manslaughter 
Gavin Leigh* 
 
Abstract The aim of this article is to separate out and justify two means of 
proving manslaughter by an unlawful (and dangerous) act. One is manslaughter by 
an act of intended bodily harm. The other is manslaughter by an unlawful and 
dangerous act. Some historical authority for these two kinds of unlawful act 
manslaughter is established, but the line of argument centres on the separate 
justifications for each kind. The justification for manslaughter by an act of intended 
bodily harm centres on the relationship between intention and luck. The justification 
for manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act concentrates on the distinction 
between negligence and heedlessness. This article concludes that manslaughter by 
an act of intended bodily harm may be justifiable, but that this may be possible 
where death is caused through any advertent crime. This is with a view to potential 
development or reform through the courts or Law Commission. 
 
Keywords Unlawful act manslaughter; moral luck; intention; negligence; 
heedlessness 
 
Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of Richard Buxton’s ‘classic article’1 on 
unlawful act manslaughter and the tenth anniversary of the Law Commission’s most 
recent proposals for its reform. Buxton’s view, that unlawful act manslaughter is 
justified by an act of intended bodily harm, can be contrasted with the slightly wider 
                                                           
*Lecturer in Law, Coventry University Law School, George Eliot Building, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 
5FB. I would like to thank Ian Edwards, Paul Almond, Daniel Bansal, Daniel Lowe, Joe Conway, 
David Ormerod and Andrew Ashworth for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1 A. Ashworth, ‘Case Comment’ [2013] Crim LR, 4, 335 at 336. Cf. R. Buxton, ‘By Any Unlawful Act’ 
(1966) 82 LQR 174. 
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approach of the Law Commission, for whom intention or recklessness was sufficient. 
Nevertheless, Glanville Williams had suggested, before Buxton laid down his line of 
attack, that ‘every charge of involuntary manslaughter … [should instead 
necessitate] proof of criminal negligence … as to the death’.2 Criticism of unlawful 
act manslaughter can be found in the Victorian Criminal Law Commissioners’ Fourth 
Report,3 and as recently as four years ago Andrew Ashworth noted that the ‘conflict 
of principle’ had still to be resolved.4 The Court of Appeal’s current position is that 
manslaughter can be established by a reasonably foreseeable risk of some bodily 
harm in the circumstances known to the defendant,5 through the commission of an 
advertent criminal act,6 which (legally) caused death. For the appellate court, 
legislative intervention was the recommended way forward.7 In this article, I hope to 
establish moral and historical authority for two separate kinds of unlawful act 
manslaughter. I will argue that the current, amalgamated, crime is illogical: liability 
may be established on the basis of a death that is neither intended nor foreseen, nor 
even capable of being foreseen by the individual concerned. With a view to 
separating out the possible justifications for two kinds of unlawful act manslaughter, I 
will establish some historical authority for both means of proof, before considering 
the possible justifications for each. The conclusion will suggest that manslaughter by 
                                                           
2 G. Williams, ‘Constructive Manslaughter’ [1957] Crim LR 293 at 301. 
3 H. M. Commissioners on Criminal Law, Fourth Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revising 
and Consolidating the Criminal Law (1839) xxviii: ‘It may be very questionable whether, in point of 
principle, an effect wholly unexpected and unconnected with the intention and act of the party, except 
by accident, can properly be made the foundation of criminal responsibility; for as the object of 
punishment is the prevention of crime, it ought properly to be annexed to such acts as are in 
themselves culpable by reason of their mischievous tendency, and the intention with which they are 
done, and not to such as are simply accidental and unintentional.’ Italics added. 
4 Above n. 1 at 337. 
5 R. v JF and another [2015] EWCA Crim 351, [2015] All ER (D) 117 (Mar). Cf. D. P. P. v Newbury 
and Jones [1977] AC 500 (HL). 
6 The Court of Appeal indicated that the mental element for the crime was sufficient, not necessary, 
suggesting that the unlawful conduct need only be committed voluntarily and that, as a possible 
result, no crime is established without the death which is consequently caused. Cf. R. v Andrews 
[2002] EWCA Crim 3021, [2002] All ER (D) 321. 
7 R. v JF and another [2015] EWCA Crim 351, [2015] All ER (D) 117 (Mar) at [33] (Lord Thomas, CJ). 
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an act of intended bodily harm may be justifiable, but that this may be possible 
where death is caused through any advertent crime. 
 
More thoughts about the integrity of unlawful act manslaughter 
The Law Commission’s recommendation was that ‘“criminal act manslaughter”’ 
should be defined as ‘killing another person (a) through the commission of a criminal 
act intended by the defendant to cause injury, or (b) through the commission of a 
criminal act that the defendant was aware involved a serious risk of causing some 
injury’.8 The Law Commission’s definition was, therefore, wider than that of 
manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm. By a serious degree of risk,9 the 
Law Commission did not mean to qualify the degree of risk generally required for 
recklessness.10 For the last two decades the debate has been characterised by 
arguments surrounding so-called “one punch” manslaughter: one punch might, for 
example, cause the victim to fall awkwardly, hit his or her head and accidentally die 
as a result. Barry Mitchell and Jeremy Horder have respectively argued either that a 
foreseeable risk of death is required, in the context of committing an advertent 
criminal act,11 or that, from the standpoint of ‘moral luck’,12 causing death is 
indivisible from the violation of respect for physical integrity involved in an act of 
intended bodily harm.13 
                                                           
8 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Cm 304 (2006) para.1.38. 
9 Ibid. at para 3.40: ‘more than insignificant or remote’. 
10 R. v Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413, [2006] All ER (D) 239 (Oct) at [15] (Hallett LJ): ‘it is, in our 
view, simply unarguable that, as a matter of law, since G a trial judge is bound to qualify the word 
“risk” by the words “obvious and significant” and, without such qualification, any directions on 
recklessness are fundamentally flawed.’ 
11 B. Mitchell, ‘More Thoughts about Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter and the One-punch 
Killer’ [2009] Crim LR 502. 
12 T. Nagel, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1979) 26: ‘Where a significant 
aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in 
that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.’ 
13 J. Horder, ‘Violating Physical Integrity: Manslaughter by Intentional Attack’, in J. Horder (ed.), 
Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012) 140. 
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Unlawful (and dangerous) act manslaughter 
It is important to recognise that the two kinds of unlawful act manslaughter–causing 
death by an act of intended bodily harm and causing death by an unlawful and 
dangerous act–both clarify and obscure one another. Foster’s definition–‘if one give 
[sic] another a box on the ear, or strike with a stick, or other weapon not likely to kill, 
and unluckily and against his intention kills, it is manslaughter’14–was clarified by the 
requirement, in Larkin,15 that the degree of bodily harm should be injury. Larkin16 
relied on Archbold,17 to the extent that manslaughter by an act of intended bodily 
harm was amalgamated with unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter.18 Archbold 
was not clear about the distinction between manslaughter by an act of intended 
bodily harm and unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter,19 although it did 
recognise unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter,20 which was indicated to have 
involved a probable risk of bodily harm since Fenton.21 Part of the courts’, or reform 
bodies’, aversion to raising the required degree of foreseeable harm to that actually 
caused, has been a concern to deter, however inefficiently,22 crimes of violence:23 
                                                           
14 H. M. Commissioners on Criminal Law, Second Report of Her Majesty’s Commissioners for 
Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law (1846) 56 (Thomas Starkie): ‘Foster, Disc. II., ch. 5, ss. 
1-2; and ch. 1, ss. 1-2’. Cf. J. F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. III 
(Macmillan: London, 1883) 56: ‘If he intentionally strikes him a blow with his fist or with a small stick 
with no intention to inflict any great harm, and happens to kill him, he is guilty of manslaughter.’ 
15 R. v Larkin [1943] KB 174, [1943] 1 All ER 217 (CCA). 
16 Ibid. 
17 J. F. Archbold, A Summary of the Law relative to Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases, R. E. 
Ross and M. Turner (eds), 30th edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1938). 
18 Above n. 15 at 219. 
19 Above n. 17 at 900: ‘All struggles in anger, whether by fighting, wrestling, or in any other mode, are 
unlawful and [that] death occasioned by them is manslaughter at the least. R. v. Canniff 9 C. & P. 
359.’ 
20 Above n. 17 at 902: ‘Where a dangerous and unlawful act is done, even in sport, if death results it is 
manslaughter: e.g.…Fenton’. 
21 Fenton’s and Others’ Case (1830) 1 Lewin 179, 168 ER 1004. 
22 See Buxton, above n. 1 at 174. 
23 Attorney General’s Reference (No 60 of 2009) (R. v Appleby) [2009] EWCA Crim 2693, [2009] All 
ER (D) 182 (Dec). 
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their views have arguably been obscured by the amalgamated definition, which 
includes both crimes of violence and non-violent crimes. 
The implication of Horder’s “pure” manslaughter, by an act of intended bodily 
harm, is that there is ‘no independent work to do … for the dangerousness 
element’.24 Moreover, as Smith notes, in the nineteenth century most cases were ‘in 
the nature of an assault and therefore intrinsically carry the risk of some harm.’25 
Support for this view can be found in Plummer,26 where Gurney, B., remarked that: 
 
this manslaughter wears a very different aspect from those which ordinarily 
come under our notice. In the great majority of cases, the manslaughter, 
indeed, I may say in almost all such cases, the death, is the result of some 
violent act done or committed.27 
 
This explains why Buxton noted that it was not ‘positively laid down in any of the 
nineteenth-century cases that the act must have been not only unlawful but also 
“dangerous”’.28 An act of intended bodily harm had been recognised in Russell’s text 
for practitioners: 
 
any one [sic] who voluntarily, knowingly, and unlawfully, intends hurt to the 
person of another, though he intend not death, yet, if death ensue, is guilty of 
murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances of the nature of the 
                                                           
24 Above n. 13 at 152. 
25 K. J. M. Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal 
Jurisprudence 1800-1957 (Clarendon: Oxford, 1998) 196. 
26 R. v George Plummer (1844) 1 Car & K 600, 174 ER 954. 
27 Ibid. at 604–605. 
28 Above n. 1 at 183. 
6 
 
instrument used, and the manner of using it, as calculated to produce great 
bodily harm or not.29 
 
There was, however, a second kind of unlawful act manslaughter, which was 
historically recognised. This was apparent from Foster, and in the practitioners’ texts 
of East and Russell, all of whom recognised an element of dangerousness in their 
definitions of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. The Victorian Criminal Law 
Commissioners acknowledged this element of Foster’s definition, not only in relation 
to immoral, but also unlawful, acts as its constructive basis.30 Russell,31 relying on 
East,32 suggested a requirement that ‘the act might probably breed danger’.33 
It seems likely, then, that there were and potentially could be two kinds of 
unlawful act manslaughter, which might conceivably have separate moral or legal 
justifications. One was causing death by an act of intended bodily harm. The other 
was arguably causing death by an unlawful and dangerous act. 
 
Manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm 
Horder initially suggested that there were grounds for homicide liability with regards 
to the unintended and unforeseen consequences of an attack.34 This was through a 
change of normative position: it can be described as a shift in terms of the criminal 
liability that ought to be imposed for the consequences of a defendant’s action, 
                                                           
29 W. M. O. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors, Vol. I (Joseph Butterworth and Son 
and J. Cooke: London, 1819) 756. 
30 Above n. 3 at xxix: ‘It is observable that in the above case the learned Judge does not appear to 
have relied entirely on the ground that the act from which death resulted was malum in se, he further 
observes that the practice is “dangerous to by-standers.”’ Cf. above n. 3 at xlii: ‘1 East’s P.C., 259. 1 
Hale’s P.C., 39, 475. This rule makes the killing manslaughter where the act … is unlawful and is 
attended with risk to the person’. Italics added. 
31 Above n. 29. 
32 E. H. East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I (J. Butterworth and J. Cooke: London, 1803) 
257. 
33 Above n. 29. 
34 J. Horder, ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law’ [1995] Crim LR 759 at 764. 
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where that action was an intended criminal act of violence; if the violent act is 
committed recklessly, liability should not extend beyond the degree of personal harm 
foreseen and risked. For this, Horder relied on his malice and proportionality 
principles.35 The malice principle was said to permit liability for the unforeseen 
consequences of an intended attack on another’s person, or property, provided that 
those consequences were of the same kind, if not of the same degree. The 
proportionality principle indicated, however, that the degree of unforeseen harm 
caused should be proportional to that intended. Although Ashworth criticised 
Horder’s proportionality principle as ‘vague’, it was suggested that this proportionality 
might equate to one step up in a ladder of offences against the person, so that, for 
example, an intended act of grievous bodily harm was sufficient justification for 
liability with regards to consequently causing death.36 This meant that the label 
murder, but not manslaughter,37 could be justified in these terms. 
The change of normative position implied by intentionally attacking another 
was approached quite differently by John Gardner. For him, the advertent 
commission of a crime provides notice of impending liability for its unforeseen 
consequences. This means that the defendant has an opportunity to avoid liability for 
homicide by avoiding the commission of a crime, the dangerous circumstances of 
which cause death. Gardner was clear that an advertent crime, which includes 
recklessness or intention in its definition, is a more efficient means of putting the 
defendant on notice of liability for unforeseen consequences which flow from the 
commission of that crime.38 Morally speaking, the ‘killing’ was put forward as the 
                                                           
35 J. Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ (1997) 113 LQR 95. 
36 A. Ashworth, ‘A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal 
Law’ (2008) 11 New Criminal Law Review 232 at 252. 
37 The appropriateness of the label “manslaughter” is outside the scope of this article. 
38 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Introduction by John Gardner’ in J. Gardner (ed.), Punishment and Responsibility, 
Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) xlv: ‘A fact that she 
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‘basic wrong’, but the rule of law was said to change the defendant’s normative 
position through the unlawful act.39 As Ashworth noted, however, ‘fair warning of an 
unfair rule does not turn it into a fair rule.’40 For him, the defendant should be able to 
choose whether to risk liability for homicide, and this choice should be based on a 
foreseen, or at least a foreseeable, risk of death; this is an element of the 
correspondence principle.41 Gardner explained that changing one’s normative 
position was not meant as a justification of the law, only as a means of 
understanding it.42 
One of Ashworth’s suggested means of justifying liability in these 
circumstances was the harm which is objectively risked.43 Mitchell argued that 
although the degree of risk could not readily be calculated in all circumstances, the 
risk of death from a punch might be said to be ‘strictly’ foreseeable.44 This was, 
however, an alternative justification from the change of normative position. It does 
not tell us why a defendant should be held liable for homicide on the basis of an 
intended act of violent crime; instead it suggests that an objective risk of death is 
enough. This is a possible justification for manslaughter by an unlawful and 
dangerous act, but not manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm. 
Ashworth determined that the real justification for the change of normative 
position was, therefore, the intention to attack another’s person, and that the 
proportionality principle merely acted as a limitation on the extent of liability for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
could have become aware of by paying more attention is a possible substitute, but it is by no means a 
perfect substitute. It leaves more to chance in the warning that the law gives to the defendant of her 
impending violation.’ 
39 J. Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2007) 248. 
40 Above n. 36 at 247. 
41 Ibid. 236. 
42 Above n. 39 at 247. 
43 Above n. 36 at 252. 
44 Above n. 11 at 503. 
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unforeseen consequences of an attack.45 For this, Horder had relied on the idea that 
an intended, rather than a foreseen, consequence, means that ‘I “make my own” 
luck’ with regards to its unforeseen consequences.46 This was partly reliant on 
‘Hegel’s basic claim, that one is responsible for the consequences integral to one’s 
actions’.47 Hegel believed that actions are affected by the luck inherent in a world of 
chance and that those actions still belong to us, irrespective of their unforeseen or 
unintended consequences. 
In response to Ashworth’s criticisms of the proportionality principle and, 
additionally, of the susceptibility of the ‘family of violence’ to extension on policy 
grounds,48 Horder suggested that an intended act of actual bodily harm was 
‘indivisible’ from the law’s respect for life; a moral value encompassed in ‘physical 
integrity’, which unlike damage to property cannot be consented to by the individual 
involved.49 The argument was, therefore, shifted onto new ground, which was said to 
have nothing at all to do with whether death is a foreseeable result.50 
But what is it that imbues intention with such justificatory force? Part of one 
answer to this lies in Horder’s reference to Antony Duff’s explanation of an 
intentional attack as the ‘active hostility’ displayed in that action,51 as compared to 
his association of risk-creation with ‘endangerment’,52 but it also lies in a 
reassessment of how intention relates to luck. 
There are, it has been said, both cognitive and affective states of mind. A 
cognitive state of mind involves, for example, foresight of an outcome as possible, 
                                                           
45 Above n. 36 at 255. 
46 Above n. 34. 
47 J. Horder, ‘Questioning the Correspondence Principle–A Reply’ [1999] Crim LR 206 at 211. 
48 Above n. 36 at 244. 
49 Above n. 13. 
50 See Horder, above n. 13 at 143. 
51 R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) 151. 
52 R. A. Duff, ‘Whose Luck Is It Anyway?’ in C. M. V. Clarkson and S. Cunningham (eds), Criminal 
Liability for Non-Aggressive Death (Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot, 2008) 64. 
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probable, or virtually certain. An affective state of mind is an attitude towards that 
outcome. This can consist in an attitude of pursuit, as is the case with an intended 
outcome,53 or the means by which that outcome is pursued. But it can also include 
risk-taking where an action’s risked outcome was not foreseen, but could have been; 
an attitude that has been described as ‘practical indifference’.54 This attitude is a 
subjective state of mind, even if the risk is not adverted to.55 So whilst subjective risk-
taking involves an affective and/or a cognitive state of mind intended harm displays 
an affective and a cognitive state of mind. 
Horder suggested that recklessness, by contrast with intention, involves only 
‘pure luck’.56 His argument was that, where intention is concerned, the individual is 
‘striving’ to accomplish the outcome–the attitude of pursuit.57 This, it was said, was 
superimposed on Hegel’s basic claim above. Hegel, however, indicated that ‘[i]n 
acting I must expose myself to misfortune; that also has a right to me, and is the 
manifestation of my own will.’58 There is, therefore, an argument that our actions do 
not always lead to the consequences we foresee or intend and that we know or 
ought to know this.59 
Part of the reason that Duff distinguished between attack and endangerment, 
was that the action involved in an attack is ‘structured’ by the need to cause harm:60 
                                                           
53 A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd: London, Henley and Boston, 
1978) 46. 
54 R. A. Duff, Caldwell and Lawrence: The Retreat from Subjectivism (1983) 3(1) OJLS 77 at 90. 
55 J. Horder, ‘Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability’ (1997) 47(4) U Tor LJ 495, 501. 
56 Above n. 34. 
57 Above n. 47 at 212. 
58 G. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, S. W. Dyde tr. (George Bell & Sons: London, 1896) 115–
116. 
59 Cf. A. Ashworth, ‘Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability’ in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds), Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence, Third Series (Clarendon: Oxford, 1987) 20: ‘an element of capacity to choose and of 
control is assumed not only in moral discourse but also in a large proportion of dealings between 
people.’ 
60 Above n. 52. 
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its non-occurrence is seen, by the offender, as a failure or ‘a source of regret’.61 This 
is the disposition displayed by the action. Intention, it might be argued, is structured 
by its relationship with and attitude towards luck in a way that recklessness is not. If I 
punch someone squarely in the face my action suggests that I intend to cause bodily 
harm.62 This outcome is not only affected by luck, it is dependent on it. I will have 
failed if the victim suddenly moves, or if I lose my balance; my attitude towards luck 
is manifestly different from that displayed by taking a wild swing with my fist, with an 
apparent awareness that I might connect with the victim’s face and cause bodily 
harm. Whatever actually happens, the foreseen risk has been run and does not 
depend on luck.  If the victim unluckily and against my intention falls and suffers a 
fatal head injury, I show, specifically through an intended action, that my relationship 
with and attitude towards luck is qualitatively different from that shown by foresight or 
foreseeability. 
Clearly, some violent crimes are committed by an intoxicated offender. 
Manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm would require a “specific” intent, 
which means that the offender’s intent would have to be proven, even if intoxicated, 
for a manslaughter conviction to follow.63 We will see how the doctrine of prior fault 
affects manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act.64 
Perhaps, in this context, unlawful act manslaughter is morally justified. But 
does it efficiently deter? To avoid liability for causing death, without avoiding all 
violent crime, means having at least the capacity to foresee death as an eventuality. 
This is where a ‘limiting principle’ may be required.65 If the degree of harm intended 
                                                           
61 Ibid. at 67. 
62 Ibid. at 75: ‘the courts … must work only with what was displayed in and by the defendant’s criminal 
actions’. 
63 D. P. P. v Majewski [1977] AC 443 (HL). Cf. R. v Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125, [2008] QB 43. 
64 See Ashworth, below n. 120. 
65 See Ashworth, above n. 36. 
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is actual bodily harm, from a single blow, or a sufficient combination of blows, or a 
push apparently designed to cause actual bodily harm, there is an argument that 
death is a logically foreseeable result, whatever the circumstances, inasmuch as 
bodily harm is a part of killing. 
 
Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act 
If an offender causes death in the commission of an unlawful act, which does not 
involve an act of intended bodily harm, there is no justification for the attribution of 
liability for manslaughter unless death was foreseen or foreseeable. The degree of 
foreseeable harm, through the circumstances of the unlawful and dangerous act, 
becomes critical to this kind of unlawful act manslaughter’s moral and legal 
justification. Further requirements, which will be explained, include the capacity to 
foresee the risk in terms of age and mental capacity, a likely degree of risk and the 
opportunity to avoid causing it. 
Victor Tadros suggested that if the crime ‘creates a risk of death, even a small 
risk, there is good reason to see the imposition of that risk as wrongful.’66 While 
Mitchell saw the unlawful context as less important than the degree of risk involved, 
his view ultimately relies on ‘a recognisable (albeit unlikely) risk of death’.67 Buxton 
had criticised the current law, as established in Church,68 on the grounds that the 
‘irrelevant unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct is used to justify the imposition of 
liability for even a slight degree of negligence.’69 
Without the justificatory force of an act of intended bodily harm, there are no 
grounds for extending liability beyond those consequences foreseen or foreseeable; 
                                                           
66 V. Tadros, ‘The Limits of Manslaughter’ in C. M. V. Clarkson and S. Cunningham (eds), Criminal 
Liability for Non-Aggressive Death (Ashgate Publishing: Aldershot, 2008) 48. 
67 Above n. 11 at 511. 
68 R. v Church [1966] 1 QB 59 (CCA). 
69 Above n. 1 at 192. 
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the degree of harm that is or should be contemplated ought to be the death caused. 
This is supported, in part, by the correspondence principle, which involves the 
degree of harm caused equating to that intended or risked and Tadros has noted 
that this may apply to both advertent and inadvertent risk-taking.70 
It might be argued that the objective nature of dangerousness–that the risk is 
foreseeable to a bystander from the circumstances of the crime71–is a reasonable 
one, provided that it recognises the capacity of the defendant to foresee what the 
bystander would have foreseen. The law, however, has resolutely refused to follow 
the path laid down for it almost fifty years ago by HLA Hart, for whom: 
 
those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal 
capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and 
abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these 
capacities.72 
 
Punishment for this kind of risk-taking can act as a deterrent even if the sanction 
cannot act as a guide at the moment of deliberation, but instead ‘causes him to exert 
his faculties’ in ‘the knowledge that others are punished’.73 The opportunity to take 
account of the defendants’ age and mental competency, in the objective test of 
dangerousness, was declined in JF and NE.74 The Court of Appeal’s position is 
                                                           
70 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005) 95. 
71 R. v Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150 (CA). 
72 H. L. A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd edn, J. Gardner 
(ed.), (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 152. 
73 Ibid. at 134. Cf. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Vol. II, first 
published 1789, a new edition corrected by the author (E. Wilson and W. Pickering: London, 1823) ch. 
XIII, para. X: ‘although he may know that he is about to engage in the act itself … he knows not of the 
tendency it has to produce that mischief’. 
74 R. v JF and another [2015] EWCA Crim 351, [2015] All ER (D) 117 (Mar). 
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difficult in the light of various recommendations for reform, but the test can hold a 
defendant liable for failing to reach a standard that s/he is incapable of attaining. 
The degree of risk required in Larkin75 was one of likelihood and, where 
inadvertent risk-taking is concerned, part of the justification for criminal liability, at 
least with regards to negligence, is that the degree of risk is sufficient to suggest to 
the defendant the obvious risk of which s/he should have been aware. In this 
respect, the justifications differ in terms of the kind of foreseeability involved: 
manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm relies on death as a logically 
foreseeable result, irrespective of the circumstances; manslaughter by an unlawful 
and dangerous act depends on death as a likely and, therefore, foreseeable 
outcome in all the circumstances. Unlawful act manslaughter appears to require, 
because this was obiter, a risk.76 Newbury77 indicated that ‘Church … [was] not 
intend[ed] to differ from or qualify anything which had been said in … Larkin’,78 but 
subsequent decisions have referred to a likelihood,79 a risk,80 or the risk.81 The 
Victorian Criminal Law Commissioners did not quantify the degree of risk involved,82 
but Fenton was reported as a ‘prove[n] … probable consequence [of] death or 
injury’.83 The view that probable risk should be necessary was supported by jurists 
including Holmes on the basis of an opportunity to avoid causing harm,84 and by 
Edwin Clark (and the Victorian Commissioners85) on the understanding that it was 
                                                           
75 Above n. 15. 
76 R. v Carey [2006] EWCA Crim 17, [2006] All ER (D) 189 (Jan) at [31] (Dyson LJ). 
77 DPP v Newbury and Jones [1977] AC 500 (HL). 
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necessary to suggest to the offender the risk of which s/he should have been 
aware.86 Kenny subsequently interpreted Franklin87 as involving ‘such torts as are 
likely to cause bodily hurt.’88 The court in Larkin relied on Archbold,89 which 
illustrated the idea that the requirement of dangerousness involved an act that was 
‘likely to injure’,90 and appeared to from Fenton91 onwards.92 This likelihood should 
be a matter of common experience, which is within jurors’ collective capabilities. 
Unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter seemed to depend on avoiding the 
circumstances in which the crime was committed: the Victorian Commissioners 
referred to circumstances in which ‘the act from which death results is unlawful and 
is attended with risk to the person’;93 John Austin to ‘an act from which he was bound 
to forbear, because he adverts not to certain of its probable consequences’;94 Foster 
to ‘an action, unlawful in itself, … done heedlessly and incautiously’.95 
Heedlessness suggests that unlawful act manslaughter was reliant on a 
different form of probable risk, irrespective of any potential requirement of 
dangerousness before Larkin.96 In Long,97 counsel for the prosecution made 
reference to Foster: ‘“if an action, unlawful in itself, be done deliberately … and the 
act was done heedlessly and incautiously, it will be manslaughter”’.98 The authority 
                                                           
86 E. C. Clark, An Analysis of Criminal Liability (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1880) 46. 
87 R. v Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163. 
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for heedlessness was further appended to the report in Joseph Martin.99 It appeared, 
therefore, that unlawful act manslaughter should not simply have been established 
by causing death through the voluntary commission of an unlawful act, but that the 
act ought to have been heedless, or at least dangerous. This was in stark contrast to 
Hale’s earlier view of the law.100 Austin, whose lectures were known of in the 
1830s,101 but whose influence on jurisprudence was not fully felt until his work was 
posthumously published,102 described the difference between negligence and 
heedlessness in these terms: 
 
The states of mind which are styled “Negligence” and “Heedlessness,” are 
precisely alike. In either case, the party is inadvertent. In the first case, he 
does not an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts not to it. In the 
second case, he does an act from which he was bound to forbear, because 
he adverts not to certain of its probable consequences. Absence of a thought 
which one’s duty would naturally suggest, is the main ingredient in each of the 
complex notions which are styled “negligence” and “heedlessness.”103 
 
Clark also distinguished between negligence and heedlessness, arguing that 
negligence ‘in its proper sense, is confined to non-act.’104 Unlike negligence, 
heedlessness relates only to probable risk and not to the conduct involved. There is 
no standard of conduct from which to depart, because the unlawful and dangerous 
                                                           
99 R. v Joseph Martin (1827) 3 Car & P 211, 172 ER 390. 
100 M. Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I, first published 1680, S. Emlyn, G. Wilson 
and T. Dogherty (eds) (E. Rider, Little-Britain: London, 1800) 474: ‘if A. without the licence of B. hunt 
in the park of B. and his arrow glancing from a tree killeth a by-ftander [sic], to whom he intended no 
hurt, this is manflaughter [sic], becaufe [sic] the act was unlawful’.  
101 See Smith, above n. 25 at 122. 
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act should not have been committed at all.105 Negligence can involve the failure to 
take a different opportunity in relation to the foreseeable risk. “Gross” negligence 
comprises a failure to take straightforward precautions, which would have been 
taken by the reasonable person. In this way, gross negligence manslaughter may be 
the result of failing to minimise a foreseeable risk that has already been created.106 
Contrast this with heedlessness, which involves the creation of a foreseeable risk. By 
comparison with dangerousness, heedlessness meant that the unlawful act should 
not have been committed at all, because the act could be dangerous in the 
circumstances. The opportunity to avoid the creation of risk existed before the 
unlawful and dangerous act was committed and not as a result of dangerous 
circumstances arising during the unlawful act’s commission. Its justification came 
from dangerous circumstances and not simply from the commission of the unlawful 
act. Russell noted that the heedless act causing death was unlawful (and 
manslaughter) because it ‘was likely to breed danger’ in the circumstances.107 
Foster, on the other hand, seemed to believe that there should be an unlawful act 
and heedlessness. These views, taken together, focus attention on the dangerous 
circumstances of the unlawful act and, therefore, the opportunity to avoid them. 
Dangerousness is also an objective test but, by way of contrast, can involve the 
foreseeable risk arising during the commission of the crime, rather than before. It has 
been widened to include all of the circumstances surrounding the crime,108 but does 
not always allow the defendant to avoid creating the risk.109 This means that it is not 
always possible to avoid creating the risk in the circumstances. Heedlessness 
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involves doing something which could only have been foreseen and avoided if the 
dangerous circumstances are readily avoidable. I hope to show how important this 
distinction is to unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter when we address two 
similar cases in more detail. 
The importance of having the mental capacity to foresee and the opportunity 
to avoid the required harm is illustrated in JF and NE’s Case,110 in which the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed the objective nature of dangerousness with regards to unlawful act 
manslaughter. The medical evidence suggested that JF, who was fourteen-and-a-
half at the time of the incident, had the mental capacity of a six-year-old. He was 
convicted of the manslaughter of a homeless man, which was caused by a fire that 
he had started in the basement of a derelict building. The defendants had been 
acquitted of arson recklessly endangering life and it is not even clear that an adult 
would have appreciated that the smoke and carbon monoxide from the fire could kill 
someone in less than five minutes. Heedlessness does not affect the degree of 
foreseeable harm required, neither does it affect the capacity to foresee, but its 
significance lies in the opportunity to avoid creating the risk. 
The significant issue, with regards to heedlessness, is that those 
circumstances known to the bystander allow the defendant ‘to exercise the capacity 
to advert to’ the foreseeable risk and to avoid it.111 There may be circumstances in 
which the foreseeable risk arises during the performance of the unlawful act, but 
cannot be avoided. The bystander should also be aware of all those circumstances 
which the defendant is aware of in committing the crime, including those which are 
known beforehand. 
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The fact that dangerousness does not account for the opportunity to avoid the 
risk was evident in Watson,112 where the Court held that: 
 
the appellant’s unlawful act comprised the whole of the burglarious intrusion 
and he must have become aware of his victims [sic] frailty and approximate 
age.113 
 
Although the risk of some harm became foreseeable during the course of the 
unlawful act, Watson could not avoid creating the risk of bodily harm caused by the 
victim’s frailty and age. Horder suggested that this could be prosecuted by means of 
manslaughter by gross negligence but, even if it were proven that ‘D carried on with 
the burglary despite knowing that a frail householder was aware’,114 the risk could 
not be minimised in this way and should that even be relevant with regards to the 
commission of a crime? 
In Bristow115 the Crown placed reliance on the fact that the workshops, from 
which a vehicle was stolen, were close to the farmhouse in which the deceased 
lived, and the ‘burglary would involve the use of heavy vehicles ... at night [that] 
would have to manoeuvre in a confined space.’116 The risk of bodily harm was 
foreseeable and avoidable. Treacy, L.J., held that this was: 
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not a case like Dawson or Watson where the circumstances demonstrating 
the risk of harm to the occupier of property did not arise until a point during 
the burglary or at all.117 
 
It should be acknowledged that the unlawful act was a ‘conspiracy to burgle’ and that 
prospective circumstances therefore had more significance,118 but the idea of 
potentially focusing on prior opportunity is no less valid. 
Heedlessness, like negligence, requires us to look at a wider time-frame than 
recklessness when determining whether the defendant should have recognised the 
risk involved. This does not mean, as in Watson’s Case,119 that crimes need 
necessarily be seen as continuing acts, but it does mean that the courts should look 
to circumstances which would have given the defendant the opportunity to foresee 
and avoid creating the risk, even if those circumstances precede the commission of 
the criminal act. Ashworth explained any reliance on circumstances known 
beforehand: 
 
enquiry into capacity and opportunity necessitated by negligence liability 
widens the time-frame of the criminal law, giving precedence to the doctrine of 
prior fault over the principle of contemporaneity.120 
 
In terms of prior fault, the defendant who has killed in the course of an unlawful act 
can only really be said to have ‘made oneself a “time-bomb”’,121 as Chris Clarkson 
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suggested,122 if there was the capacity to foresee and the opportunity to avoid the 
creation of the risk. The doctrine is important, therefore, in recognising that a failure 
to recognise an obvious risk need not arise at the same time as the unlawful act that 
causes death: the opportunity to foresee and avoid the dangerous circumstances 
may appear before the unlawful act has been committed; the heedless risk-taking 
and the unlawful act need not be seen as contemporaneous. 
Anthony Kenny noted that the ‘threat of punishment for negligence is meant to 
enforce at all times a standard of care’.123 This, of course, can only be done if there 
is prospective notice of the potential duty and this is where the law is ‘at its 
retrospective worst’.124 In the case of heedlessness the threat of punishment would 
enforce a standard of foresight in the commission of an advertent crime, so that 
individuals exert their faculties with regards to dangerous circumstances created by 
committing that crime. 
The need for a distinction between negligence and heedlessness is illustrated 
by applying both to the facts of Bristow.125 The duty of care required for gross 
negligence manslaughter and its breach might have been established: manoeuvring 
vehicles at night in a confined space could have exposed the householder to a 
reasonably foreseeable and serious risk of death.126 But the idea that unlawful and 
dangerous act manslaughter cases can be dealt with under gross negligence 
manslaughter has been doubted.127 The creation of risk was foreseeable before the 
unlawful act was committed and there was, therefore, the opportunity to avoid it by 
avoiding the unlawful act. By carrying on the defendants had been heedless. 
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Negligence suggests that the risk has been created through taking insufficient care 
before or during an activity. Heedlessness suggests that the risk has been created 
by the activity. The opportunities to minimise the risk or to avoid creating it are 
different. 
 
Reconstructing unlawful act manslaughter 
The law as it stands is an amalgam of two different kinds of unlawful act 
manslaughter. Without the justificatory force of an act of intended bodily harm, the 
correspondence principle tells us that liability for death is appropriate only where 
death is intended or foreseen,128 or at least foreseeable.129 Even Ashworth, who 
argued that an intended act of actual bodily harm that causes death should not be 
labelled as a homicide offence,130 acknowledges that liability for negligently causing 
death may be justified ‘subject to certain conditions (for example an incapacity 
exception, and suitable rule-of-law protections such as due notice).’131 
In the light of the Court of Appeal’s view, that these issues should once again 
be referred to the Law Commission,132 the time has come to recognise the separate 
justifications involved in manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, as 
compared with an act of intended bodily harm.  In the absence of these hoped-for 
reforms, the courts have shown themselves to be capable of reaching the 
appropriate degree of harm in gross negligence manslaughter.133 It may be that the 
most that can be achieved through legislation is the sought-after capacity exception, 
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which has been compared to the impact that section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1967 had on the presumption of intended consequences.134 There is certainly 
inconsistency between the objective tests in gross negligence manslaughter and 
unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. In the recent case of R. v. S,135 the Court 
of Appeal held that the objective test, in gross negligence manslaughter, denoted ‘a 
reasonable and prudent person of the applicant’s age and experience’.136 Why 
should the Court of Appeal make this exception and at the same time refuse to 
acknowledge the capacity of the defendants in JF and NE?137 
It is, however, arguable that even in the context of such an exception, 
advertent risk-taking is more culpable than heedlessness. But can it really be said 
that: ‘actions which, for all one knows, may be dangerous are less dangerous than 
actions which one positively knows to be a risk’?138 Actions which, for all one knows, 
may create risks are arguably more prevalent, if less culpable, because they are 
more difficult to avoid than advertent creation of risk. The advertent risk-taker has not 
avoided taking the risk, but surely inadvertent risk-taking is no less prevalent.139 
There is historical authority for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and 
manslaughter by an act of intended bodily harm. The moral authority for the latter 
may reside in the law’s respect for physical integrity or an attitude towards luck. But it 
must not be forgotten that they were and could be separate means of proving 
manslaughter with separate justifications. Unlawful act manslaughter might be 
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justified, at least in part, by the opportunity to avoid the creation of the foreseeable 
risk. 
This would involve a different approach from the most recent recommendation 
of the Law Commission.140 There are grounds for unlawful act manslaughter where 
the likely risk of death, from the commission of an unlawful act in the circumstances, 
can be foreseen and avoided by an individual of the same age as the defendant, 
provided that s/he is mentally/physically able and that s/he is put on notice of the 
required standard of foresight, through the commission of an advertent crime. If it is 
felt necessary to limit the scope of unlawful act manslaughter to crimes of violence, 
actual bodily harm is an appropriate degree of harm provided that it is intended. 
Fifty years ago, in his ‘classic’ article,141 Buxton argued that ‘there is perhaps 
something to be said for making the degree of hazard required rather less severe 
when it is intentionally as opposed to negligently caused.’142 That ‘something’ is 
arguably pursuit, which is an attitude of dependency on luck, displayed by an act of 
intended bodily harm. 
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